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CHAPTER
 28
ARBITRATORS: APPOINTMENT  
AND REMOVAL*
Arbitrator: An Overview
An arbitrator is a person to whose attention the matter in dispute is 
submitted by the parties, a judge of the parties’ own choosing. They 
are professional and business people who are appointed to assist in the 
informal resolution of disputes because of their knowledge, experience 
and reputation in upholding fairness and impartiality. His function is 
judicial, an impartial judge to dispense equal justice to the disputing 
parties. He will decide on the law and facts involved in the matter 
submitted to him with a view to determine and finally resolve the 
controversy. In Re Carus and Wilson-Greene,1 Lord Esher stated:
If it appears from the terms of the agreement by which a matter is 
submitted to any person, that what he is to do, is to be in the nature of 
a judicial enquiry, and that the object is that he should hear the parties 
and decide the matter upon evidence to be led before him, there the 
person is an arbitrator. 
According to Russell:
An arbitrator is neither more nor less than a private judge of a private 
court (called an arbitral tribunal) who gives a private judgment (called 
an award). He is a judge in that a dispute is submitted to him; he is not 
a mere investigator but a person before whom material is placed by 
* This chapter is contributed by Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed.
1 (1886) 56 LJQB 530.
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the parties, being either or both of evidence and submissions; he gives 
a decision in accordance with some recognised system of law and the 
rules of natural justice. He is private is so far as;
(a) he is chosen and paid by the disputants; 
(b) he does not sit in public; 
(c) he acts in accordance with privately chosen procedure so far as 
that is not repugnant to public policy; 
(d)  so far as the law allows, he is set up to the exclusion of the state 
courts; 
(e)  his authority and power are only whatsoever he is given by 
the disputant’s agreement; (f) the effectiveness of his powers is 
derived wholly from the private law of contract and accordingly 
the nature and exercise of these powers must not be contrary to 
the proper law of contract or public policy of England, bearing in 
mind that the paramount public policy is that freedom of contract 
is not lightly to be interfered with.2 
Arbitrators have some expertise in the field of the dispute and they 
come from different educational and professional backgrounds 
including law, accounting, insurance, finance, health care, engineering, 
architecture and construction. In fact, many arbitrators are retired or 
former judges and lawyers and the arbitration agreement may specify 
the qualifications of potential arbitrators. In Malaysia, a person aspiring 
to be an arbitrator will have to fulfil the stringent requirements set by 
the Asian International Arbitration Centre (AIAC) which include 
having tertiary education, sufficient experience in arbitration and 
any membership or accreditation from any professional membership 
organisation for Alternative Dispute Resolution. When empanelled 
with the AIAC, he/she will be bound by the AIAC’s Code of Conduct 
for Arbitrators.3
2 DSJ Sutton Russell on Arbitration (24th Edn).
3 See ‘Become a Panellist’ at https://www.aiac.world.
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Appointment Of Arbitrator
 
An arbitrator is appointed in accordance with the wishes of the parties 
and they are free to determine the number of arbitrators.4 Where the 
parties fail to determine the number of arbitrators, s. 12(2) of the 
Arbitration Act 2005 (‘the Act’) states that in the case of an international 
arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators and 
in the case of a domestic arbitration, a single arbitrator. Where the 
arbitration consists of three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one 
arbitrator, and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint the third 
arbitrator as the presiding arbitrator.5 Unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, no person shall be precluded by reason of nationality from 
acting as an arbitrator.6 
Further, the parties are free to agree on the procedure for appointing the 
arbitrator or the presiding arbitrator.7 If the parties have stipulated in 
the arbitration agreement as to the manner in which the appointment of 
an arbitrator or arbitrators shall be made, the procedure contemplated 
by the parties shall be followed and the arbitrator or arbitrators is/are 
appointed in accordance with the procedure agreed upon. As stated 
earlier, since the arbitration agreement is contractual in nature, neither 
side can travel outside the terms of the contract.
If the party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days of receipt 
of a request in writing to do so from the other party or the two 
arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days of their 
appointment, either party may apply to the Director of the AIAC for such 
appointment.8 Section 13(5) also provides that where in an arbitration 
with a single arbitrator, the parties fail to agree on the procedure for 
appointing the arbitrator or the presiding arbitrator, either party may 
apply to the Director of the AIAC for the appointment of an arbitrator. 
4 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 12(1).
5 Ibid s. 13(3).
6 Ibid s. 13(1).
7 Ibid s. 13(2). 
8 Ibid s. 13(4).
Appointment Of  Arbitrator
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Further, s. 13(6) provides:
Where, the parties have agreed on the procedure for appointment of 
the arbitrator—
(a) a party fails to act as required under such procedure;
(b) the parties, or two arbitrators, are unable to reach an agreement 
under such procedure; or
(c) a third party, including an institution, fails to perform any 
function entrusted to it under such procedure, any party may 
request the Director of the Asian International Arbitration Centre 
(Malaysia) to take the necessary measures, unless the agreement 
on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing 
the appointment.9 
And s. 13(7) states that where the Director of the AIAC is unable 
to act or fails to act under the above-mentioned procedure within 
30 days from the request, any party may apply to the High Court for 
such appointment. 
In appointing an arbitrator, the Director of the AIAC or the High Court, 
as the case may be, shall have due regard to: 
(a) any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of 
the parties;
(b) other considerations that are likely to secure the appointment of 
an independent and impartial arbitrator; and
(c) in the case of an international arbitration, the advisability of 
appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than those of the 
parties.10 
9 In Sundra Rajoo Nadarajah v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Luar Negara, Malaysia & Ors 
[2019] 1 LNS 443, it was stated inter alia, that the applicant, the former Director 
of  AIAC, was entitled to protection for acts and omissions in his official capacity 
and that the power to waive the immunities can only be done by the Secretary 
General of  the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee.
10 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 13(8). 
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In Sebiro Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Bhag Singh & Anor,11 it was stated that 
s. 13(8) of the Act does not stipulate that before the appointment of an 
arbitrator, the consent of the parties is required nor does it stipulate 
that before the arbitrator is appointed, the Director of the KLRCA 
(now AIAC) is required to seek consent of the parties. The decision of 
the Director of the AIAC or the High Court shall be final and no appeal 
shall lie against their decision.12 
Revoking Authority Of Arbitrator: Application By Disputants
The arbitrator has wide discretion on the conduct of the proceedings 
and the courts will not ordinarily disturb the arbitrator’s procedural 
conduct.13 What is important is that an arbitrator must be independent 
and impartial which are the essential components of a fair trial. He is 
expected to carry out his role and responsibilities with integrity and 
efficiency. In Sundra Rajoo v. Mohamed Abd Majed & Anor,14 Hamid 
Sultan Abu Backer J (as His Lordship then was) emphasised that:
 (i) the requirement of impartiality is a principle of natural justice; 
 (ii) it is a fundamental principle that an arbitrator must remain 
independent and impartial; 
 (iii) where an arbitral tribunal contains party-nominated arbitrators, 
the presumption remains that, even if nominated by one of the 
parties, the arbitrator will be independent and impartial; 
11 [2015] 4 CLJ 209, CA.
12 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 13(9).
13 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 21(1) provides: 
‘ ... the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral 
tribunal in conducting the proceedings.’
See Majlis Perbandaran Shah Alam v. Menara Biru Sdn Bhd & Anor [2009] 6 
CLJ 694. 
14 [2011] 6 CLJ 923, HC.
Revoking Authority Of  Arbitrator: 
Application By Disputants
 
FOR ACADEMIC 
REPOSITORY 
PURPOSES 
ONLY
536 Arbitrators: Appointment And Removal
 (iv) a party-nominated arbitrator is usually appointed in international 
arbitrations by reason of culture or background, to be broadly 
sympathetic with the case to be put forward, but who will be strictly 
impartial when it comes to assessing the facts and evaluating the 
arguments on fact and law; 
 (v) a party may nominate an arbitrator who is generally predisposed 
towards it personally, or as regards to its position in the dispute, 
provided that the person concerned is at the same time capable of 
impartial and judicial application to the evidence and arguments 
submitted by both parties.15 
The appointment of an arbitrator may be terminated by the arbitrator’s 
own resignation. Alternatively, a party to the arbitration proceeding 
may seek to revoke the arbitrator’s authority by an application to court. 
It is trite law that the court may revoke the authority of an arbitrator 
on grounds of misconduct or lack of impartiality. In Kuala Ibai 
Development Sdn Bhd v. Kumpulan Perunding (1988) Sdn Bhd & Anor,16 
Nik Hashim J (as he then was) when dealing with the Arbitration Act 
1952 held: 
[1] Parties to an arbitration are entitled to expect from an arbitrator 
complete impartiality and indifference, both as between themselves 
and with regard to the matters left to the arbitrator to decide. 
They are also entitled to expect from him a faithful, honest and 
disinterested decision. Lack of impartiality or bias will be a 
ground on which objection may be taken against an arbitrator. 
The arbitrator must not only be free from bias but there must not 
even be an appearance of bias.
[2] An arbitrator must always act judicially with a detached mind and 
with patience. He must not at any time descend into the arena or 
take an adversarial role. His response and words used must always 
be measured and circumspect. He must rule only after hearing the 
parties. He should always maintain the dignity and impartiality of 
the appointment. 
15 Ibid at [10].
16 [1999] 1 CLJ 632.
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[3] The power of the High Court to give relief for leave to revoke 
the authority of the arbitrator where an arbitrator is not 
impartial is provided under s. 25 of the Act. The meaning of the 
word “impartial” in s. 25(1) of the Act is not restricted to the 
relationship of the arbitrator to any other parties to the agreement 
or connection of the arbitrator to the subject referred. 
[3a] If an arbitrator is not impartial he should be disqualified and it 
does not matter whether his lack of impartiality arose out of his 
relationship or connection with one of the parties or the subject 
referred. 
[4] An arbitrator can be or perceived to be impartial arising out of his 
conduct or arising out of his racial prejudice. 
[5] As to whether an arbitrator is deemed to be biased or not, the 
‘reasonable suspicion’ test and the ‘real likelihood’ test are both 
accepted as being the law at present. The trend, however, is towards 
the application of the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test as in essence the 
‘reasonable suspicion’ test seems to be somewhat broader than the 
‘real likelihood’ test. ...
The court can order the removal of an arbitrator when it can be 
established that either or both parties have lost all confidence in the 
impartiality and integrity of the arbitrator, for example, the arbitrator 
misconducted himself17 or that the award had been improperly 
17 The term ‘misconduct’ in arbitration does not connote the moral turpitude of  
the arbitrator but the failure of  the arbitrator to adhere to the principle of  
natural justice such as appearance of  bias or partiality. In Sharikat Pemborong 
Pertanian & Perumahan v. Federal Land Development Authority [1969] 1 LNS 172, 
Raja Azlan Shah J (as his Highness then was) said:
‘... In the law of  arbitration misconduct is used in its technical sense as 
denoting irregularity and not moral turpitude. It includes failure to perform 
the essential duties which are cast on an Arbitrator as such, for instance, 
failure to observe the rules of  natural justice, appearance of  bias or partiality. 
It also includes any irregularity of  action which is not consonant with the 
general principles of  equity and good conscience. These illustrations are not 
meant to be exhaustive. ...’ 
 In Sundra Rajoo Nadarajah v. Chong Lee Siong [2009] 10 CLJ 708, the plaintiff  
who was appointed as an arbitrator under the PAM Arbitration Rules, was 
removed by a court order as he had misconducted in the proceedings. See also 
Ng Chee Yew Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v. IJM Corporation Bhd & Anor [2009] 1 LNS 
1225, HC; Bintang Merdu Sdn Bhd v. Tan Kau Tiah @ Tan Ching Hai & Anor 
& Other Cases [2009] 1 LNS 621, HC.
Revoking Authority Of  Arbitrator: 
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procured.18 This includes the arbitrator’s failure to perform the essential 
duties which were cast on him and failure to observe the rules of natural 
justice such as the appearance of bias or partiality.19 It also includes 
any irregularity of action which is not consonant with the general 
principles of equity and good conscience.20 In Sabah Medical Centre Sdn 
Bhd v. Syarikat Neptune Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Anor,21 the arbitrator’s 
adverse comments and conclusions that SMC’s claim was ‘inequitable’, 
questioning the bona fides of the claim were all made in circumstances 
where evidence on the issue of liquidated and ascertained damages had 
yet to be adduced and submissions made. A real possibility had arisen 
that the arbitrator had already made up his mind against SMC and that 
he would not have been able to approach the issues with an open mind.
It is noteworthy that s. 14(1) of the Act requires a potential arbitrator to:
... disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as 
to that person’s impartiality or independence.
Further, s. 14(2) provides that an arbitrator shall, without delay, from 
the time of appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings, 
disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as 
to his impartiality or independence to the parties unless the parties 
have already been informed of such circumstances by the arbitrator. 
‘Justifiable doubts’ of the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence and 
the arbitrator not possessing the qualifications agreed to by the parties 
are the basis for an application to remove the arbitrator.22 Section 14(3) 
provides:
18 See Dato’  Samsudin Abu Hassan v. Robert Kokshoorn [2003] 3 CLJ 1, CA.
19 See Sabah Medical Centre Sdn Bhd v. Syarikat Neptune Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Anor 
[2012] 10 CLJ 767, HC. 
20 See Intelek Timur Sdn Bhd v. Future Heritage [2004] 1 CLJ 743, FC.
21 [2012] 10 CLJ 767, HC.
22 See SJEE Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Al-Ambia Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2018] 1 
LNS 922, HC.
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An arbitrator may be challenged only if—
(a) the circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to that 
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence; or
(b) that arbitrator does not possess qualifications agreed to by the 
parties.
The phrase ‘justifiable doubts’ was highligted in SJEE Engineering Sdn 
Bhd v. Al-Ambia Sdn Bhd & Another Case,23 where Darryl Goon Siew 
Chye JC stated:
[66] All that is required to be established are “justifiable doubts”. To 
put it the other way around, there need only be doubts as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. However, such doubts 
must be “justifiable” having regard to the circumstances. It need 
not be proven that the arbitrator is impartial or not independent. 
Whether the arbitrator is “probably” or “possibly” impartial or not 
independent are also not the test prescribed under s. 14 of the AA. 
To my mind, it would also follow that fanciful suppositions and 
mere suspicion would be insufficient. All these is because of the 
very words used by the legislation — “justifiable doubts”. 
In SJEE Engineering’s case, it was stated that being unhappy with any 
direction given or any decision made in the course of arbitration per se is 
not grounds to doubt the impartiality or independence of an arbitrator. 
Again, in Indera Construction Sdn Bhd v. PNS Development Sdn Bhd,24 it 
was stated inter alia, that an inference of bias could not be made merely 
because the interim rulings leaned largely in favour of the defendant. 
Likewise, in Ng Chee Yew Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v. IJM Corporation Bhd 
& Anor,25 it was stated inter alia, that the arbitrator could not be blamed 
for taking necessary steps to expeditiously conduct the proceedings.
23 Ibid.
24 [2014] 7 CLJ 911, HC.
25 [2009] 1 LNS 1225, HC.
Revoking Authority Of  Arbitrator: 
Application By Disputants
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At this juncture, it is worthwhile to note that the rule of natural justice 
which is an important component in the administration of justice 
revolves on the principles of impartiality and fairness.26 It ensures, inter 
alia, that the decision-making body is impartial and independent, and 
that it adopts procedures fair to all parties. Primarily, this is to prevent 
the decision from being tainted with allegation of miscarriage of justice 
on procedural grounds. The right to be heard and the rule against bias 
are among the important principles of the rules of natural justice. The 
above two rules which are separate concepts and governed by separate 
considerations are derived from two maxims namely, audi alteram 
partem (no order should be made without hearing the other side) and 
nemo judex in causa sua (a man should not be a judge in his own cause).
The rule on hearing both disputants requires that an individual 
shall not be penalised by a decision affecting his rights or legitimate 
expectations unless he has been given prior notice of the case against 
him, a fair opportunity to answer the allegations and the opportunity to 
present his side of the matter. The disputants must have the opportunity 
to present its version of the facts and to make submissions and the 
allegations against them.27 Meanwhile, the rule against bias revolves 
on the maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria causa, which means 
‘one who is interested in the subject matter of a dispute should exclude 
himself from acting as justice therein.’
Further, an essential part of the justice system is the phrase, ‘justice 
should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be 
done’.28 A ‘fair minded observer’, acting ‘reasonably’29 should be able to 
say that justice was done without there being any element of bias on the 
26 B Surinder Singh Kanda v. The Government of  the Federation of  Malaya [1962] 1 
LNS 14, PC.
27 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 20 of  the Act provides:
‘The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a fair 
and reasonable opportunity of  presenting that party’s case.’
28 R v. Sussex Justices; Ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259 per Lord Hewart CJ.
29 Ambard v. A-G for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322 at 335, [1936] 1 All ER 
704 at 709, PC per Lord Atkin.
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part of the adjudicator. The House of Lords in Franklin v. Minister of 
Town and County Planning,30 stated, inter alia, that the use of the word 
‘bias’ should be confined to its proper sphere:
Its proper significance ... is to denote a departure from the standard of 
even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy 
judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a  
quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is 
that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come 
to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination 
or bias towards one side or other in the dispute’. 
Litigants must have the confidence and trust in the impartiality of the 
adjudicating officer.31 To put the principles against bias in perspective, 
no one can be a judge in his own cause, that is to say in a case in which 
he is directly or indirectly interested. If a member of an arbitral tribunal 
is ‘subject to bias’, whether personal or official, in favour of or against 
any party to a dispute, or is in such a position that bias must be assumed 
to exist, he ought not to take part in the decision or sit on the tribunal.32 
In other words, if an arbitrator has any pecuniary or proprietary interest 
in the outcome of the proceedings, however small in the subject matter 
of inquiry, or any other interest in the subject matter of the trial as to 
create a reasonable suspicion of bias, he must disqualify himself from 
hearing the matter. The fact that the adjudicator is an interested party 
or has any pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject matter of the 
dispute affords the strongest proof that he cannot be indifferent, and in 
such situations, justice may not be seen to be done.
30 [1948] AC 87, [1947] 2 All ER 289, HL.
31 See Dato’  Dr Joseph Eravelly v. Dato’  Hilmi Mohd Nor & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 294, 
HC. 
32 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 2: ‘Arbitral tribunal’ means an emergency arbitrator, a 
sole arbitrator or a panel of  arbitrators.’ 
Revoking Authority Of  Arbitrator: 
Application By Disputants
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Where an application is made, for example, to recuse the trial judge 
from hearing and deciding a case, the applicant must satisfy the court 
that ‘there is a real danger of bias’33 on the part of the judge if he or she 
were to proceed to hear the case. However, each case has to be decided 
on its own set of facts and circumstances and there cannot be a blanket 
disqualification.34 In Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd 
& Anor,35 a case cited by VT Singham J in Dato’ Dr Joseph Eravelly 
v. Dato’ Hilmi Mohd Nor & Ors,36 the English Court of Appeal stated 
inter alia, that it would be dangerous and futile to attempt to define or 
list the factors which may or may not give rise to a real danger of bias. 
Everything will depend on the facts, which may include the nature of 
the issue to be decided. In particular, the court observed: 
... a real danger of bias might well be thought to arise if there were 
personal friendship or animosity between the judge and any member of 
the public involved in the case; or if the judge were closely acquainted 
with any member of the public involved in the case, particular if the 
credibility of that individual could be significant in the decision of the 
case; or if, in a case where the credibility of any individual were an 
issue to be decided by the judge, he had in a previous case rejected the 
evidence of that person in such outspoken terms as to throw doubt on 
his ability to approach such person’s evidence with an open mind on 
any later occasion; or if on any question at issue in the proceedings 
before him the judge had expressed views, particularly in the course of 
hearing, in such extreme and unbalanced terms as to throw doubt on 
his ability to try the issue with an objective judicial mind. 
33 In R v. Gough [1993] AC 646 at 670, [1993] All ER 724 at 737, HL, Lord 
Goff  of  Chieveley noted, inter alia, that the expression ‘real danger’ is preferred 
to ‘real likelihood’ to ensure that the court is thinking in terms of  possibility 
rather than probability of  bias.
34 See Dato’  Tan Heng Chew v. Tan Kim Hor [2006] 1 CLJ 577, FC; Majlis 
Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor 
Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 CLJ 65, FC; Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors 
v. Ketua Polis Negara [2001] 4 CLJ 701, FC; Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn 
Bhd & Ors v. Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [2002] 4 CLJ 268, CA.
35 [2000] QB 451 at 480, [2000] 1 All ER 65 at 76.
36 [2011] 3 CLJ 294 at [7].
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The mere fact that a judge, earlier in the same case or in a previous case, 
had commented adversely on a party or witness, or found the evidence 
of a party or witness to be unreliable, would not without more found 
a sustainable objection. In most cases, we think, the answer, one way 
or the other, will be obvious. But if in any case there is real ground for 
doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal. We repeat: 
every application must be decided on the facts and circumstances of 
the individual case. The greater the passage of time between the event 
relied on as showing a danger of bias and the case in which the objection 
is raised, the weaker (other things being equal) the objection will be.
The above mentioned principles of natural justice have been vigorously 
and firmly enforced by the courts of law, arbitration and other quasi-
judicial tribunals.37 It also includes those bodies which have to act 
judicially in deciding the rights of others such as domestic inquiries 
and administrative proceedings.38 Violation of the above principles of 
natural justice is a justifiable ground to seek for judicial review against 
the decision or award. Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Act provides that 
an award may be set aside by the High Court if the court finds that 
the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia. And 
s. 37(2)(b) states that an award is in conflict with the public policy of 
Malaysia where a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred during 
the arbitral proceedings or in connection with the making of the award.
Revoking Authority Of Abitrator: Application By Co-Arbitrator
In an arbitral tribunal comprising of more than one arbitrator, the 
question arises whether an arbitrator has locus standi to seek the 
removal of a co-arbitrator. The High Court had, in Sundra Rajoo 
v. Mohamed Abd Majed & Anor,39 addressed this issue. In this case, the 
37 Frome United Breweries Co Ltd v. Keepers of  the Peace and Justices for County 
Borough of  Bath [1926] AC 586, HL.
38 Gullapali Nageswara Rao v. State of  Andhra Pradesh AIR 1959 1376 at 1379, SC 
per Justice Subra Rao.
39 [2011] 6 CLJ 923, HC.
Revoking Authority Of  Abitrator: 
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application to revoke the authority of the arbitrator was not made by 
the parties to the arbitration proceedings namely, Haryana Oils & 
Soya Ltd and Sangrur Agro Ltd, but by the applicant, Sundra Rajoo, a 
co-arbitrator. The applicant had sought an order of the court requesting 
that the first respondent to declare and/or disclose all his past and 
present appointments by Virgoz Oils & Fats Pte Ltd and its group of 
companies to the following arbitration proceedings conducted under 
the auspices of the second respondent: 
(1) arbitration case no. A330 between Virgoz and Haryana Oils 
& Soya Ltd; and 
(2) arbitration case no. A331 between Virgoz and Sangrur Agro 
Ltd. 
Alternatively, the applicant requested for an order that the second 
respondent declare and/or disclose the first respondent’s past and 
present appointments in the above mentioned arbitration cases. The 
applicant also sought an order to remove and disqualify the first 
respondent as the arbitrator of the arbitration cases nos. A330 and 
A331. 
The facts of the above case as laid down by the learned trial judge, 
Hamid Sultan Abu Backer J (as he then was), are as follows:
The applicant and the 1st respondent are co-arbitrators with one by the 
name of Lim Guan Leong who was appointed in arbitration cases A330 
and 331 where the claimant is Virgoz and the respondents are Haryana 
Oils & Soya Ltd and Sangrur Agro Ltd respectively. Both Haryana and 
Sangrur have refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings. 
Apart from cases A330 and 331 the 1st respondent and the applicant 
had been appointed in three other PORAM [Persatuan Penapis Minyak 
Sawit Malaysia] Arbitrations where Virgoz and/or the Virgoz group 
were the respondents (three arbitrations). It must be noted that the 1st 
respondent in all the above proceedings were appointed by Virgoz and/
or their group.
The claimant in the three arbitrations had objected to the 1st respondent 
on the grounds that the 1st respondent had been nominated by Virgoz 
and/or the Virgoz group in over twenty PORAM Arbitrations and his 
participation would be perceived as bias. On the basis of the objection 
the 1st respondent had voluntarily resigned as the co-arbitrator in the 
three arbitration proceedings.
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The applicant having come to know the facts and being aware of 
the fact that Haryana and Sangrur have chosen not to submit to the 
arbitration proceedings in A330 and A331, has taken upon himself the 
task to preserve the sacrosanct status of arbitration tribunal to make 
this application upon: (i) the 1st respondent’s refusal of disclosure of all 
his present and past appointments by the Virgoz group to the parties to 
cases A330 and A331; (ii) the 2nd respondent’s refusal to do the same 
notwithstanding the 2nd respondent had advised that such disclosure 
by the 1st respondent will be in order.
The reason the 2nd respondent advances for not making any disclosures 
from the records is that PORAM Rules and the Arbitration Act 2005 
(AA 2005) do not make provision for bodies such as PORAM to make 
disclosures as to the previous appointment received by arbitrators.
The 1st t respondent has raised a number of side issues to oppose the 
applications. However, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent says 
that “the real issue should be whether the 1st respondent owes a duty 
to disclose to another co-arbitrator who already made up his mind that 
the 1st respondent is partial and biased and the failure to answer to a 
‘hostile and fishing’ request amounts to ‘partiality and biasness’”.40 
The applicant’s application was allowed with costs. The first respondent 
was ordered to disclose his past and present appointments to the 
arbitral tribunal within seven days failing which he would be removed 
and disqualified as an arbitrator in Arbitration Cases nos. A330 and 
A331. In arriving at the above conclusion, the learned trial Judge had 
given reasons for his decision which can be broadly categorised into the 
following sub-headings.
(a) Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrator. His Lordship 
agreed with the submission of the applicant that the most 
important element in the requirement of impartiality and 
independence is disclosure. Reference was made to the United 
States Supreme Court case of Commonwealth Coatings Corp 
v. Continental Casualty Co.41 In the above case, Justice Byron 
White stated:
40 Ibid at [3]-[7].
41 393 US 145 (1968).
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The arbitration process functions best when an amicable 
and trusting atmosphere is preserved and there is voluntary 
compliance with the decree, without need for judicial 
enforcement. This end is best served by establishing an 
atmosphere of frankness at the outset, through disclosure by 
the arbitrator of any financial transactions, which he has had 
or is negotiating with either of the parties. 
 According to the learned Judge in Sundra Rajoo’s case:
... the requirement of impartiality is a principle of natural 
justice, and in consequence the court has an inherent 
jurisdiction to check its breach or purported breach at limine42 
when the complaint comes from any interested party involved 
and it may include co-arbitrator or witnesses etc; and is not 
one limited to the litigants to the arbitration proceedings  
per se.43 
(b) Breach of Natural Justice May Render the Arbitral Award 
Void. It was stated that the argument by the learned counsel for 
the first respondent that the applicant had no locus standi to seek 
the disclosure was not supported by case laws or jurisprudence. 
It was further stated that the court was sufficiently empowered 
to entertain such an application and hear it on merit as breach 
of natural justice in appropriate cases, may render an arbitral 
award void.
(c) Fiduciary Duty Applicable to Arbitrators. The learned Judge 
noted that the courts in India had gone to the extent of saying 
that the doctrine of uberrima fides or utmost good faith is 
applicable to arbitrators.44 In particular, the learned Judge 
stated:45 
42 The Latin term ‘at limine’ means ‘at the outset, on the threshold’.
43 [2011] 6 CLJ 923 at [10].
44 Satyendra Kumar v. Hind Constructions Ltd AIR 1952 Bom 227.
45 [2011] 6 CLJ 923 at [10].
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I am inclined to say that the jurisprudence relating to fiduciary 
may be applicable to arbitrators; as ultimately in consideration 
of a fee they are entrusted to deliver an award. The Lexis Nexis 
Hong Kong Legal Dictionary defines fiduciary relationship as 
follows:
The critical feature of a fiduciary relationship is that the 
fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of, or in 
the interests of, another person in the exercise of a power or 
discretion which will affect the interests of that other person 
in a legal or practical sense. A fiduciary relationship is a 
relationship which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity 
to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that 
other person, who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the 
fiduciary of his or her position. The extent of a fiduciary 
relationship may be restricted by a contract: Kelly v. Cooper 
& Anor [1993] AC 205, (PC). The relationship between 
solicitor and client is fiduciary giving rise to specific legal 
and professional obligations on the part of the solicitor: 
McMaster v. Byrne [1952] 1 All ER 1362, (PC); Brown v. IRC 
[1965] AC 244, (HL).
Support for similar propositions can be found in a number of 
cases. To name a few are as follows: (a) Boardman v. Phipps 
[1966] 3 All ER 721; (b) Mohd Latiff bin Shah Mohd & Ors  
v. Tengku Abdullah ibni Sultan Abu Bakar & Ors and other 
actions [1995] 2 MLJ 1; (c) Kartika Ratna Thahir v. PT 
Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) 
[1994] 3 SLR 257. In essence the category of persons who may 
be liable as fiduciary has always been an open subject which 
falls within the jurisdiction of the courts to decide on the facts. 
In Reading v. R [1949] 2 KB 232 at 236, CA, Asquith LJ made 
the following observations:
... there is a well-established class of cases in which he can 
so recover, whether or not he has suffered any detriment 
in fact. These are cases in which the servant or agent has 
realised a secret profit, commission or bribe in the course 
of his employment; and the amount recoverable is a sum 
equal to such profit. In most of these cases it has been 
assumed that the plaintiff, in order to succeed, must prove 
that a ‘fiduciary relation’ existed between himself and the 
defendant and that the defendant acted in breach of this 
relation, but the term ‘fiduciary relation’ in this connection 
Revoking Authority Of  Abitrator: 
Application By Co-Arbitrator
 
FOR ACADEMIC 
REPOSITORY 
PURPOSES 
ONLY
548 Arbitrators: Appointment And Removal
is used in a very loose, or, at all events, a very comprehensive, 
sense. A consideration of the authorities suggests that for 
the present purpose a ‘fiduciary relation’ exists (a) whenever 
the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant property tangible or 
intangible (as, for instance, confidential information) and 
relies on the defendant to deal with such property for the 
benefit of the plaintiff or for purposes authorised by him 
and not otherwise…(b) whenever the plaintiff entrusts 
to the defendant a job to be performed, for instance, the 
negotiation of a contract on his behalf or for his benefit, and 
relies on the defendant to procure for the plaintiff the best 
terms available ... .
(d) Duty of Disclosure Not Merely Restricted to Disputing 
Parties. The first respondent vehemently argued that the duty 
of disclosure is only to the parties involved in the dispute. 
Reference was made to s. 8 of the Act where it provides to the 
effect that the jurisdiction for the court to interfere is restricted.46 
In relation to the above argument, the learned Judge stated:47 
The reading of the said section clearly does not prohibit 
the intervention of court per se. It provides for a minimum 
intervention as strictly provided by the Act and governed by 
the Act. When the Act is silent on any issues outside the scope 
of the Act or is not governed by the Act then the common 
law powers of the court cannot be said to be ousted. The AA 
2005 does not remove the inherent jurisdiction of the court. 
In my view inherent jurisdiction of the court cannot be a 
ground to intervene with any matter which has been provided 
for in the Act. I have dealt with this area of jurisprudence in 
the case of Taman Bandar Baru Masai Sdn Bhd v. Dindings 
Corporations Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 CLJ 83. I do not wish to repeat 
the same. In the instant case no provision has been made for 
co-arbitrators to seek such reliefs as prayed notwithstanding 
there is provision for the litigant to do so.
46 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 8 provides:
‘No court shall intervene in matters governed by this Act, except where so 
provided in this Act.’
47 [2011] 6 CLJ 923 at [10].
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(e) Whether Applicant a Party to Arbitration Proceedings. The 
first respondent asserted that the applicant was not a party to 
arbitration proceedings and in consequence, s. 14 of the Act 
does not apply to the applicant. The word ‘party’ in s. 14(4) of 
the Act is defined in s. 2 of the same Act namely:
... a party to an arbitration agreement or, in any case where an 
arbitration does not involve all the parties to the arbitration 
agreement, means a party to the arbitration. 
 On the other hand, the applicant contended that he should be 
regarded as a party to the arbitration within the meaning of s. 2 
above. The applicant asserted that a contract exists between the 
parties and the arbitrators i.e. a bilateral contract. Such contract 
creates rights and obligations for both the arbitrators and 
the parties. Where arbitration is administered by an arbitral 
institution, the contractual relationship becomes triangular. In 
relation to the above, the learned judge agreed with the applicant’s 
arguments and made reference to the following cases:
(i) In Compagnie Europeene de Cereals SA v. Tradax Export SA,48 
Hobhouse J stated:
It is the arbitration contract that the arbitrators become 
parties to by accepting appointments under it. All parties to 
the arbitration are as a matter of contract (subject always to 
the various statutory provisions) bound by the terms of the 
arbitration contract.
(ii) In K/S Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd,49 Sir 
Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC stated:
The arbitration agreement is a bilateral contract between the 
parties to the main contract. On appointment, the arbitrator 
becomes a third party to that arbitration agreement, which 
becomes a trilateral contract: Compagnie Europeene de Cereals 
SA v. Tradax Export SA [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 301. Under that 
trilateral contract, the arbitrator undertakes his quasi-judicial 
48 [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 301.
49 [1992] QB 863, [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 524.
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functions in consideration of the parties agreeing to pay 
him remuneration. By accepting appointment, the arbitrator 
assumes the status of a quasi-judicial adjudicator, together with 
all the duties and disabilities inherent in that status. Amongst 
those disabilities is an inability to deal unilaterally with one 
only of the parties to the arbitration, let alone to bargain with 
one party alone for a personal benefit.
Having cited the above authorities, the learned Judge stated:50 
It is trite that the arbitrator assumes the status of a quasi-judicial 
adjudicator with all its inherent duties and obligations. On the facts 
of the instant case I am satisfied that the 1st respondent ought to 
have disclosed his past and present appointments to preserve the 
dignity of his office and avoid the award at the end of the day to be 
set-aside pursuant to s. 37(2)(b) of AA 2005 which reads as follows:
(b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred:
(i) during the arbitral proceedings; or
(ii) in connection with the making of the award.
The applicant has a legitimate ground to seek the assistance of 
the court at common law to arrest the mischief in limine as he is a  
co-arbitrator and after having received a remuneration for work he may 
become personally liable in contract and/or negligence and/or breach 
of his fiduciary duty for having participated in an award which has a 
real likelihood of being set-aside pursuant to s. 37(2)(b) of AA 2005.
His lordship added:51 
It is disappointing to note that in this time and era where 
transparency, accountability and good governance has become a 
trite jurisprudence in arbitration proceedings to check impartiality 
and/or any form of vagaries, the 1st respondent’s conduct of non-
disclosure and resistance on the facts of the case notwithstanding 
the 2nd respondent has requested to do so, may place the 1st 
respondent, a person unfit to decorate the arbitral seat and/or hold 
any form of quasi-judicial work and/or sit as an arbitrator.
50 [2011] 6 CLJ 923 at [10].
51 Ibid.
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As from Sundra Rajoo’s case, the applicant, a co-arbitrator, had legitimate 
grounds to seek the assistance of the court to compel the first applicant 
to disclose his past and present appointments to preserve the dignity 
of his office. This is primarily to avoid the award at the end of the day 
from being set-aside on grounds of violation of the principles of natural 
justice. It was further stated that the applicant may become personally 
liable in contract and/or negligence and/or breach of his fiduciary 
duty for having participated in an award which has a real likelihood of 
bias. The above formed a justifiable basis for the award to be set aside 
pursuant to s. 37(2)(b) of the Act.52 Further, to the above, an interesting 
observation by the learned Judge in Sundra Rajoo’s case is that since 
an arbitrator is in a fiduciary position who, in the exercise of a power 
or discretion, makes a decision or award that will affect the interests of 
that other party in a legal or practical sense, therefore, the doctrine of 
uberrima fides (utmost good faith) — a legal doctrine which governs 
insurance contracts — is equally enforceable to arbitrators.
Revoking Arbitrator’s Authority: Required Challenge Procedure
 
The required challenge procedure is contained in s. 15(1) of the Act: 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, any party who intends to 
challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware 
of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or of any reasons referred 
to in subsection 14(3), send a written statement of the reasons for the 
challenge to the arbitral tribunal.
Section 15(2) further provides that:
Unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws from office or the other 
party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall make a decision 
on the challenge.
52 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 37(2)(b) provides that an award is in conflict with the 
public policy of  Malaysia where breach of  the rules of  natural justice occurred, 
during the arbitral proceedings; or in connection with the making of  the award.
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Where a challenge is not successful, s. 15(3) provides that the challenging 
party may, within 30 days after having received notice of the decision 
rejecting the challenge, apply to the High Court to make a decision on 
the challenge. While such an application is pending, s. 15(4) provides 
that the arbitral tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator, may 
continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award. The decision of 
the High Court under sub-s. (3) shall be final and s. 15(5) provides that:
No appeal shall lie against the decision of the High Court under 
subsection (3).
From the above, whether there is justifiable basis to remove an 
arbitrator, there must first be a challenge to the arbitrator’s fitness to act 
besides complying with the specific timelines namely, within 15 days 
after becoming aware of the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal or 
of any reasons referred to in sub-s. 14(3). More importantly, a written 
statement of the reasons for the challenge must first be provided so as 
to enable the arbitral tribunal to make a decision on the challenge.53 The 
intervention of the court can only start when the challenge before the 
arbitral tribunal was not successful.54 
In Tan Sri Dato’ Professor Dr Lim Kok Wing v. Thurai Das Thuraisingham 
& Anor,55 the applicant made an application to the High Court to 
remove the first respondent as the arbitrator on the basis that there was 
no agreement for arbitration between the applicant and the architect 
in the second proceeding. Instead of sending a written statement to 
the Arbitral Tribunal of the reasons for the challenge and attending 
the proposed preliminary meeting arranged by the arbitrator, the 
applicant had raised the complaint with KLRCA and Pertubuhan 
Arkitek Malaysia. As the applicant had not taken the correct approach 
to challenge the appointment or fitness of the first respondent to act as 
arbitrator there was no basis for this application. 
53 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 18(1) of  the Act provides:
‘The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections 
with respect to the existence or validity of  the arbitration agreement.’
54 In Salconmas Sdn Bhd v. Kementerian Dalam Negeri & Anor [2018] 1 LNS 
846, it was stated inter alia, that ss. 14 and 15 of  the Arbitration Act 2005 are 
mandatory laws to be followed in order to remove an arbitrator.
55 [2011] 1 LNS 717, HC.  
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Besides the above, s. 16(1) of the Act provides that where an arbitrator 
becomes unable to perform the functions of that office, or for other 
reasons fails to act without undue delay, the arbitrator’s mandate 
terminates on withdrawal from office or if the parties agree on the 
termination. Where any party disagrees on the termination of the 
mandate of the arbitrator, sub-s. (2) provides that any party may apply 
to the High Court to decide on such termination. The decision of the 
High Court shall be final and no appeal shall lie against that decision.
Appointment Of Substitute Arbitrator
 
Section 17(1) provides that a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed in 
the following circumstances: 
(a) the mandate of an arbitrator terminates under section 15 or 16;
(b) an arbitrator withdraws from office for any other reason;
(c) the mandate of the arbitrator is revoked by agreement of the 
parties; or
(d) in any other case of termination of mandate.
Where a single or the presiding arbitrator is replaced, s. 17(2) provides 
that any hearings previously held shall be repeated before the substitute 
arbitrator. Where an arbitrator other than a single or the presiding 
arbitrator is replaced, any hearings previously held may be repeated 
at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. It is noteworthy, that the 
replacement of a member of an arbitral tribunal does not change the 
character of the arbitral tribunal. It is still the same arbitral tribunal but 
with a different composition of members.56 Unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties, any order or ruling of the arbitral tribunal made prior to 
the replacement of an arbitrator under this section shall not be invalid 
solely on the ground there has been a change in the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal.57 
56 The Government Of  India v. Vedanta Limited & Anor [2018] 1 LNS 617, HC.
57 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 17(3). 
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Conclusion
One of the fundamental aspects of the arbitral process is its independence 
and the impartiality of the arbitrator. An arbitrator acts in a similar 
manner to a judge in the ordinary courts of law. He will deliver a legally 
binding decision known as an award that is based on the evidence put 
before him by the parties or their representatives. It is of fundamental 
importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly 
and undoubtedly been seen to be done. An arbitrator must ensure that 
there is not the slightest appearance of bias on his part. Further, no 
person shall serve as an arbitrator in any proceeding in which he or 
she has any financial or personal interest in the outcome. In Kuala Ibai 
Development Sdn Bhd v. Kumpulan Perunding (1988) Sdn Bhd & Anor, 
Nik Hashim J held:
If an arbitrator is not impartial he should be disqualified and it does not 
matter whether his lack of impartiality arose out of his relationship or 
connection with one of the parties or the subject referred.58 
An arbitrator can be or perceived to be not impartial arising out of his 
conduct or arising out of his racial prejudice, among others. 
Therefore, prior to accepting any appointment, an arbitrator must 
disclose any circumstances likely to create an appearance of bias or 
which might disqualify him or her as an impartial arbitrator, so that 
he or she is not later challenged for engaging in unprofessional or 
unethical conduct or other misconduct in the role of an arbitrator. A 
party to the arbitration proceeding may apply to the court to revoke 
the authority of the arbitrator at any time prior to the making of the 
award in the event of any non-disclosure and/or disqualification for 
actual or apparent conflict of interest. It is trite law that the court may 
revoke the authority of an arbitrator on grounds of misconduct or lack 
of independence or impartiality.59 Even an arbitrator has locus standi 
to seek the removal and disqualification of a co-arbitrator as held in 
Sundra Rajoo v. Mohamed Abd Majed & Anor.60
58 [1999] 1 CLJ 632 at 641. 
59 Sundra Rajoo ‘Revocation of  Authority and Removal of  Arbitrator’ INSAF 
(2003) XXXII No 2 p. 1.
60 [2011] 6 CLJ 923, HC.
